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Abstract 
We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the 
second and the second may invest in the third. Any amount sent from one player to the next is 
tripled. The third player decides the final allocation among three players. The baseline treatment 
with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the 
third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third 
players increases cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of 
insider communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and 
receives 289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases 
efficiency from 44% to 68%.  
 
 
JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Trust and reciprocity play important roles in economic interactions. The most frequently 
used measure of trust and reciprocity in economics is based on a two-player trust game, proposed 
by Berg et al. (1995). In this game, the first player (trustor) sends any part of his endowment to 
the second player (trustee). The amount sent is tripled and the second player decides how much 
to return. Berg et al., as well as many replications, show that most participants display trust and 
trustworthiness contrary to self-interested profit-maximizing behavior (McCabe et al., 1998, 
2000, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Burks et al., 2003). However, the bilateral relation in the two-
player trust game rules out the multiple levels of trust that often emerge in real life when more 
than two agents are involved. For example, customers trust that the retailer will link them to a 
reliable producer. Safari travelers rely on their domestic travel company to match them with a 
high-quality foreign travel agent in Africa. Web businesses connect people with hotels, houses, 
condominiums, and other accommodations for rent. In all these relationships, the retailer, the 
domestic travel company, and the web businesses serve as a middleman linking users to goods 
and services. Whether or not to purchase via a middleman, depends on the degree to which users 
are willing to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of both the middleman and the 
provider. The redistribution of the benefits in these types of transactions is mainly controlled by 
the last player in the chain who provides goods or services to the customer and pays a 
commission to the middleman for making the linkage. 
Multi-level trust interactions are also common in financial markets. For example, a 
person investing in a bond fund must trust the fund manager to correctly represent the bonds in 
the fund. The fund manager, in turn, must trust the bond issuers. The same intuition applies in 
the fund of funds (FOF) industry, where the manager of a hedge fund company invests in other 
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funds instead of individual securities. Thus, multiple (direct and indirect) levels of trust are 
required between the individual investor, the hedge fund manager, and the FOF manager. Finally, 
multi-level trust is crucial in workplaces where the workers must not only trust their managers to 
report their performance truthfully to the CEO, but also trust that the CEO will appropriately 
reward their performance. 
This study provides a framework for understanding multi-level trust interactions in 
complex environments involving direct and indirect interactions among multiple players. We 
depart from the conventional two-player trust game of Berg et al. (1995) by introducing the third 
player. In our three-player trust game, the three players move sequentially. (1) The first player 
sends any portion of his endowment to the second player, with the amount being tripled. (2) The 
second player then decides how much to send to the third player, with the amount being tripled 
again. (3) Finally, the third player decides the final allocation among three players. The three-
player trust game captures the essential elements of complex multi-level trusting and reciprocal 
behavior in a simplified setting. 
Moreover, trust in multi-level interactions depends on the thickness and the pattern of the 
links between players. One of the indispensable social lubricants for the network of trust and 
reciprocity is communication. The multi-level interactions introduced by adding the third player 
provide us a useful platform to explore our second research question: what are the internal and 
external effects of communication on trust and reciprocity. There are many potential channels of 
communication that one can investigate in the three-player trust game, but the considerable 
complexity that arises with the introduction of communication is nontrivial.
 
As a first step, we 
focus on studying communication between the second and the third player which resembles 
insider communication in a group when only a subgroup is allowed to communicate (as far as we 
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know, this is the first laboratory study of insider communication).
1
 In the FOF example, there is 
a potential for privileged insider communication between the FOF manager and the managers of 
the hedge funds. Similarly, in the workers-manager-CEO example, the detailed discussions CEO 
and managers have in the board room are often not revealed to workers.  
We conducted treatments with and without insider communication. The results of our 
experiment indicate that even in the baseline treatment with no communication, the first and 
second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. When we allow 
communication between the second and the third player, the amounts sent and returned between 
these two increase. The new interesting finding is that there is an external effect of insider 
communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and receives 
289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases 
efficiency from 44% to 68%. Content analysis of the communication reveals that what drives the 
most efficient outcomes are the proposals of equal split among three players made by either the 
second or the third player. The effect of these types of proposals is strong enough to overcome 
tendencies toward collusion between the second and the third player. 
Our three-player trust game is related to a three-player centipede game of Rapoport et al. 
(2003) and Murphy et al. (2004).
2
 The three-player centipede game is a multi-stage game which 
can be used to address some aspects of indirect trust (Camerer 2003). However, the strategy 
space of each player in the three-player centipede game is restricted to a binary choice, whether 
to end the game and take some percentage of the available surplus, or to increase the surplus and 
allow other players a chance to end the game. Thus, it allows observing only whether indirect 
trust exists but not the magnitude of indirect trust. The three-player trust game proposed in this 
study is general enough to capture both the degrees of direct and indirect trust and reciprocity by 
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using a continuous strategy space for each player. Moreover, our game gives us the flexibility to 
analyze different communication channels and, in this paper, we focus on the external effect of 
insider communication which is new to the communication literature. 
 
II. THREE-PLAYER TRUST GAME 
We introduce a novel three-player trust game, where player 1 acts as a trustor, player 2 
embodies both the trustor’s and trustee’s characteristics, and player 3 always acts as a trustee. All 
players 1, 2, and 3 are endowed with e1, e2, and e3. Player 1 can send a portion α12 of his 
endowment e1 to player 2. The amount sent by player 1 is multiplied by factor k1. Then player 2 
can send a portion α23 of his total income to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 is multiplied 
by factor k2. Then player 3 can reciprocate to players 1 and 2 by returning portions of the total 
money received (α31 > 0 and α32 > 0). It is important to emphasize that, in returning to player 1, 
player 3 may be motivated by direct reciprocity and two types of indirect reciprocity, i.e., 
observation-based and experience-based.
3 
Moreover, being reciprocal only requires returning 
positive amounts while being trustworthy requires returning at least as much as the amount 
received (McCabe et al., 2003). 
The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the three-player trust game, which 
assumes that all players maximize their earnings, is for all players to send nothing. By backwards 
induction, player 2 knows that a rational player 3 will not return anything (α32 = α31 = 0) and 
therefore player 2 should send nothing (α23=0). Anticipating this, player 1 should send nothing to 
player 2 (α12 = 0). In this setting, if player 1 sends any positive amount (α12 > 0), it means he is 
willing to take a risky bet that both players 2 and 3 will reciprocate. In other words, player 1 
exhibits direct trust in player 2 and indirect trust in player 3. It is riskier to trust in this game than 
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in the two-player game because player 1 is repaid by player 3 and not by player 2. Therefore, 
player 1 has to trust that player 2 will pass the money to player 3 and also trust that player 3 will 
be trustworthy. The most efficient outcome is when both players 1 and 2 fully trust player 3 by 
sending all of their incomes. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
A. Experimental Design 
We conducted an experiment in which each session had two treatments: a no 
communication treatment (NC) and a communication treatment (C). Both treatments lasted for 
10 periods. We used a random stranger protocol with fixed roles. In the NC treatment, all 
subjects were randomly assigned to a specific role, designated as player 1, player 2, or player 3. 
Each subject remained in the same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each 
period, each player was endowed with e1 = e2 = e3 = 100 experimental francs and was randomly 
regrouped with two other players to form a three-player group, with each player in a different 
role. Player 1 made a decision on how many francs between 0 and 100 to send to player 2 and 
how many francs to keep. Each franc sent by player 1 was tripled (k1 = 3). After players 2 and 3 
learned the amount of francs sent by player 1, player 2 then made a decision on how many francs 
to send to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 was also tripled (k2 = 3). Finally, player 3 made 
a decision on how many francs to return to player 1, how many francs to return to player 2, and 
how many francs to keep. All subjects were told that player 1, player 2, and player 3 can send 
some, all, or none of the francs available to them. At the end of each period, the amounts sent 
and returned by all players were reported for everyone to see. Instructions, available in the online 
Appendix I, explain the structure of the game in detail. 
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To study the effects of insider communication we conducted a treatment C. The design of 
the C treatment closely followed the design of the NC treatment except that, after player 1 made 
his decision, player 2 and player 3 were able to communicate for 90 seconds in a text based “chat 
room”. Communication took place only after players 2 and 3 learned the decision made by player 
1. Subjects were told that only players 2 and 3 would see the messages. In sending messages 
back and forth, we requested subjects to be civil to each other and not to reveal their identities. 
A total of 72 undergraduate student subjects from Purdue University participated in our 
experiment. The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
We ran two NC-C sessions, in which a total of 36 subjects were engaged in 10 interactions with 
no communication and then 10 interactions with communication (NC-C sessions). The other 36 
subjects participated in the C-NC sessions, where we reversed the order of the treatments.
4
 After 
completing all 20 decision periods, 4 periods were randomly selected for payment (2 periods for 
each treatment). The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 100 francs to $1. On 
average, subjects earned $16 each and the experiment session lasted for about 90 minutes. 
 
B. Hypotheses 
Previous studies have shown that subjects care about treating others fairly (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000a), they display trust and trustworthiness contrary to self-interested profit-
maximizing behavior (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 1998), they are concerned about 
efficiency (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), and they have unconditional other-regarding 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox, 2004). In evolutionary 
literature it is found that people exhibit direct and indirect trust in other people (Buchner et al., 
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2004; Greiner and Levati, 2005).
5 
Based on these observations we provide the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Players 1 and 2 trust player 3 by sending positive amounts, and player 3 
reciprocates. 
It is also documented in a two-player trust game that the levels of direct trust and 
reciprocity are higher than the levels of indirect trust and reciprocity (Wedekind and Milinski, 
2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Seinen and Schram, 2006).
6
 Therefore, we 
expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: Player 2 trusts more than player 1, and player 3 reciprocates to player 2 
more than to player 1. 
We base our hypothesis about the effects of insider communication in the three-player 
trust game on previous findings in the communication literature. Several experimental studies of 
one-shot two-player trust games show that communication increases cooperation between trustor 
and trustee (Glaeser et al., 2000; Buchan et al., 2006; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ben-Ner 
and Putterman, 2009; Ben-Ner et al., 2011).
7 
Communication also improves cooperation in 
prisoner dilemma games (Wichman, 1972), public good games (Isaac and Walker, 1988), 
common-pool resource games (Hackett et al., 1994), voting experiments (Schram and 
Sonnemans, 1996; Zhang, 2012), and contests (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Cason et al., 2012). 
Social psychologists have identified several means by which communication can increase 
cooperation: communication creates group identity, thus improving group welfare, and 
communication elicits commitments, creating a promise-keeping norm (Bornstein, 1992; Kerr 
and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Bicchieri, 2002). In our three-player trust game, insider 
communication occurs between players 2 and 3. Therefore, we expect that: 
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Hypothesis 3: With insider communication, player 2 trusts player 3 more, and player 3 
reciprocates more. 
According to the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Chen and Li, 2009), 
individuals may put themselves and others into different categories based on perceived 
similarities and differences (categorization), identify others as in-group or out-group members 
(identification), and discriminate in favor of the in-group and against the out-group members 
(comparison). Various methods have been used to induce saliency of group identity, including 
communication between group members (Sutter, 2009; Cason et al., 2012). Since in our 
experiment insider communication occurs only between players 2 and 3, these players should 
identify each other as in-group members, while categorizing player 1 as an out-group. Such 
categorization would imply collusion between players 2 and 3, and thus less trust from player 1. 
On the other hand, as discussed previously, communication should enhance trust and 
trustworthiness between players 2 and 3, thus increasing their payoffs (Ben-Ner et al., 2011). 
Given that some individuals have preferences for equal distribution of payoffs (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), it is likely for players 2 and 3 to share their higher 
payoffs with player 1, which in turn may increase the trust level of player 1. In summary, 
depending on whether the “equal distribution” effect or the “collusion” effect dominates player 1 
will either trust more, less or the same. This is an empirical question for us to test against the 
following null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: With insider communication, player 1 trusts the same. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Our analysis in Section A focuses on the first 10-period data before switching to a 
different treatment. We discuss the order effect in details using all 20-period data in Section B. 
We mainly use parametric tests and multi-level mixed-effects linear regressions to analyze 
individual decisions.
8
 The regression models have random effects at both the individual level and 
the session level to control for correlations that may arise between individuals due to the random 
regrouping within a session over time. The within-subject residuals are estimated as being 
autoregressive of order 2 to account for the repeated measurement for each individual. 
 
A. Trust and Trustworthiness 
Table 1 summarizes the average amount sent and the profit earned by all players in the C 
and NC treatments. Among three players, player 1 earns the lowest profit while player 3 earns 
the highest profit in the experiment. In line with Hypothesis 1, in the NC treatment, players 1 and 
2 trust player 3 by sending significant amounts, and player 3 reciprocates. Moreover, in line with 
Hypothesis 2, the level of indirect trust exhibited by player 1, which is represented by 39 francs 
sent to player 2 (39% of income), is significantly lower than the level of direct trust by player 2, 
which is represented by 96 francs sent to player 3 (43% of income). The reciprocal behavior of 
player 3 is also in agreement with Hypothesis 2, with player 3 returning more to player 2 than to 
player 1 (57 versus 35 francs, 10% versus 7% of income) but the difference is only marginally 
significant.
 9
 On the other hand, on average, player 3 returns 90% of the amount received from 
player 1 but only 59% of the amount received from player 2. Thus, in terms of trustworthiness, 
neither player 1’s nor player 2’s trust pays off. On average, player 2 passes on 82% of the tripled 
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amount received from player 1 without risking his own endowment. Without communication, 
efficiency is 44%. 
[Table 1 about here] 
When insider communication is allowed between players 2 and 3, efficiency increases 
significantly from 44% to 68%. This is because on average player 2 sends to player 3 the entire 
tripled amount received from player 1 plus 50% of his own endowment. As we will show in 
Section V, player 1 correctly anticipates the increase in trust player 2 places on player 3 and 
sends 60% of his endowment to player 2 (54% more than in the NC treatment). Player 3 is 
trustworthy— player 1 receives twice the amount sent and player 2 receives 107% of the amount 
sent. Interestingly, the increased trust and trustworthiness do not change the distribution of 
payoffs among three players. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the mixed-effects linear regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the amount sent by each player in each period and the independent 
variables are a treatment dummy-variable and a period trend.
10
 As we expected, when 
communication is allowed, player 2 exhibits more trust in player 3 (specification 2). Controlling 
for the amount player 2 receives from player 1, the share of income sent by player 2 is 
significantly higher in the C treatment (specification 6). Anticipating this increase, player 1 sends 
more to player 2 (specifications 1 and 5). Comparing to the NC treatment, player 3 returns higher 
absolute and relative amounts to players 1 and 2 in the C treatment (specifications 3, 4, 7, 8). The 
two panels in Figure 1 show that the distribution of return ratio is shifted towards more generous 
behavior of player 3 in the C treatment as compared to the NC treatment. These findings are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
Although only players 2 and 3 were allowed to communicate, we find that the amount 
player 1 sends to player 2 in the C treatment is increased by 54%. This finding rejects the null 
Hypothesis 4. We conjectured that the trust level of player 1 would fall in the C treatment if 
communication would serve as a collusion device between players 2 and 3. In fact, we do find 
evidence that insider communication increases the collusion between players 2 and 3. Table 3 
categorizes player 3’s decisions conditional on positive amounts sent by players 1 and 2. In the C 
treatment, player 3 returns roughly half of his income to player 2 and nothing to player 1 in 
around 11% of the time. This did not happen once in the NC treatment. Communication also 
significantly decreases the percentage of players 3 who are trustworthy to player 1 but not to 
player 2 and increases the percentage of players 3 who are trustworthy to player 2 but not to 
player 1. Then the question is why would communication increase trust of player 1? The answer 
turns out to be very simple. In the NC treatment, player 3 almost never splits the income equally 
between three players. In the C treatment, this happens 28% of the time. Also, there is a 
significant decrease of the proportion where player 3 keeps everything to himself from 24% in 
the NC treatment to 12% in the C treatment and an increase of the proportion where player 3 is 
trustworthy to both players 1 and 2. Therefore, in the C treatment, player 1 receives 288% more 
than in the NC treatment. This means that insider communication has two opposite effects on the 
amount player 3 returns to player 1: (i) insider communication enhances collusion between 
players 2 and 3, and (ii) it also activates fairness norms and thus increases cooperation between 
all players. The cooperation effect dominates the collusion effect leading to significant efficiency 
gains.
11
 The efficiency in the NC treatment is about 44% while in the C treatment it is 68% (see 
Table 1). Moreover, as a result of communication, all players earn higher payoffs (see Table 1).
12
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[Table 3 about here] 
To better understand the determinants of trust and trustworthiness, Table 4 reports 
estimation results of different regression models, where the dependent variable is the amount 
sent by players 1, 2, and 3. To control for endogeneity we use three-stage estimation for systems 
of simultaneous equations with individual subject dummies. Besides a treatment dummy-variable 
and a period trend, we also include the observable decisions in the current period and the average 
amounts sent or received by each player across all past periods.
13
 Although we randomly re-
grouped all players with fixed roles after each period, from specification (1) we see that the 
amount player 1 sends to player 2 depends on the average amount player 1 received from all 
previous players 3. This finding suggests that player 1 is learning about the general level of 
trustworthiness exhibited by player 3. Similarly, the amount player 2 sends to player 3 depends 
on the average amount players 3 returned to player 2 in all past periods (specification 2).  
[Table 4 about here] 
Besides the past observable decisions, specifications (2), (3) and (4) show that the current 
period’s observable choices are significant determinants of the trusting and reciprocal behavior. 
Specifically, the more player 1 sends to player 2, the more player 2 passes on to player 3 and the 
more player 3 returns to player 1. More interestingly, for a given amount that player 2 sends to 
player 3, the more player 1 sends to player 2, the less player 3 returns to player 2 (specification 
3) and the more player 3 returns to player 1 (specification 4). Thus, player 3 reciprocates to 
player 2 accounting for the decisions made by player 1. In other words, consistent with Nowak 
and Sigmund (2005), we find evidence for both the observation-based indirect reciprocity (the 
amount player 3 returns to player 1 increases when player 1 sends more to player 2) and the 
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experienced-based indirect reciprocity (the amount player 3 returns to player 2 increases when 
player 2 sends more to player 3). 
 
B. Order Effects 
We conducted both C-NC sessions and NC-C sessions to examine if there is a significant 
order effect. Specifically, one interesting question is whether cooperation which subjects achieve 
during the C treatment could be sustained in the NC treatment when communication is removed. 
Figures 2a and 2b display the time trend of average amount sent by all players in different 
sessions. Figure 2a suggests that communication in the C treatment indeed influences the 
behavior of players in the consecutive NC treatment. The average amount sent by each player in 
the NC treatment is higher in the C-NC session (Figure 2a) than in the NC-C session (Figure 2b).  
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
To further account for order effects, Table 5 reports mixed-effects regressions of the 
amount all players sent on treatment and order variables. Four dummy variables that capture the 
treatment and order variations are included. The variable C-treatment x NC-C is equal to 1 if 
treatment is C and the session is NC-C. The variable C-treatment x C-NC is equal to 1 if 
treatment is C and the session is C-NC. We use the Wald test comparing these two variables to 
measure the significance of the order effect for the C treatment (see the second to the last line in 
Table 5). Similarly, two variables for the NC treatment in the NC-C session and C-NC session 
are included and the corresponding Wald tests are reported in the last line of Table 5. Clearly, 
order has a significant effect on the absolute amount sent by all players in both treatments. 
Particularly, communication is more effective in the NC-C sessions than in the C-NC sessions. A 
possible explanation is that in the NC-C sessions, after 10 periods of the NC treatment, subjects 
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understand better the efficiency cost of poor cooperation, and thus they significantly increase 
cooperation in the following C treatment. Although there is a decay of cooperation after we 
disable communication in the C-NC sessions, the level of cooperation is still significantly higher 
than in the first half of the NC-C sessions.
14
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
V. BELIEFS AND MESSAGES 
A. Beliefs 
In both C and NC treatments, after making the decision on how much to send to player 2, 
we asked player 1 to make a prediction about the actions of players 2 and 3 before seeing the 
outcome screen.
15
 Player 1 was asked to guess how much player 2 would send to player 3, how 
much player 3 would return to player 2, and how much player 3 would return to player 1. 
Subjects were financially motivated to make correct predictions. They were paid 10 francs for 
each prediction if the prediction differed by no more than 5% from the actual decision made.
16
 
We chose this belief-elicitation protocol instead of the quadratic-scoring rule mainly because it is 
simple and rather easy for subjects to understand. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 reports the average predictions of player 1 on the amounts sent by player 2 and 
returned by player 3 and the average percentage differences from the actual decisions made from 
the first 10 periods. On average player 1 makes good predictions on the amount player 2 sends to 
player 3 and the amount player 3 returns to player 2 in both C and NC treatments.
17
 However, in 
both treatments, player 1 significantly overestimates the amount player 3 returns to players 1.
18
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This overestimation may partially explain the high level of trust exhibited by player 1 in the 
three-player trust game. 
 
B. Content Analysis of Communication 
At this point we know that insider communication enhances cooperation in the group of 
three people although only a subgroup of two people is allowed to communicate. This brings us 
to the question of what kinds of messages cause this cooperation. We use content analysis to 
answer this question. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The procedure that we used to quantify the recorded messages is as follows. First, we 
randomly selected a session to develop a coding scheme. We classified the messages into 18 
categories, shown in Table 7. Then we employed two undergraduate students to code all 
messages into the coding categories independently. The unit of observation for coding was all 
messages sent out in a given period before subjects made decisions. Coders were asked not to 
start coding until they had finished reading all messages in a given period. If a unit of 
observation was deemed to contain the relevant category of content, it was coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. Each unit was coded under as many or few categories as the coders deemed 
appropriate. The coders were not informed about any hypotheses of the study.
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We use Cohen’s Kappa K as a reliability measurement of the between-coder agreement. 
This measurement determines to which extent the coders agree that a certain message belongs to 
a particular coding category. Cohen’s reliability measurement accounts for the between-coder 
agreement by chance (Hayes, 2005).
20 
Reliability K greater than zero indicates that the 
proportion of agreements exceeds the proportion of agreements expected by chance. According 
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to Landis and Koch (1977), K between 0.4 and 0.6 corresponds to a moderate agreement level 
and K greater than 0.6 corresponds to full agreement. Table 7 displays the coding scheme along 
with Cohen’s reliability indexes and the frequency of coding for the C treatment. For the vast 
majority of categories, K is greater than 0.5. As a result of infrequent coding there are few 
categories that have unsatisfactory agreement levels. In further discussions of categories we use 
the average of the two independent codings. Specifically, the value of coding is treated as 1 if 
two coders agree that a message belongs to a given category, 0 if two coders agree that a 
message does not belong to a given category and 0.5 if the two coders disagree with each other. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 reports the estimation results of mixed-effects models which have random effects 
on both the subjects and session levels and account for second-order autocorrelation in the 
within-subject residuals. The dependent variables are the absolute (specifications 1-3) and 
relative (specifications 4-6) amounts sent and returned by players 2 and 3 and the independent 
variables are various categories of messages. In all regressions, we include a trend variable 
equals the period number and a constant. The first four independent variables code the cases 
when only one proposal was made and differ by who made the proposal and whether the 
proposal was to share the profit equally between players 2 and 3 or among all three players. The 
next two variables quantify the cases when both players 2 and 3 proposed the same strategy. The 
seventh and eighth variables capture the cases when the two exchanged different proposals – to 
collude versus to cooperate. The last two message variables are the most frequently coded 
categories besides making proposals.  
There are a number of notable findings. When either player 2 (1a) or player 3 (2a) or both 
(1a+2a) propose to collude between themselves, player 3 returns significantly less absolute and 
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relative amounts to player 1 (specifications 3 and 6). The collusion proposal significantly 
increases the amount player 2 sends to player 3 only when both of them proposed it (1a+2a) and 
has a much less effect on the amount player 3 returns to player 2. When either player 2 (1b) or 
player 3 (2b) or both (1b+2b) propose to share equally among all three players, both the absolute 
and relative amounts player 2 sends to player 3 and player 3 returns to player 1 significantly 
increase. The cooperative proposal significantly increases the absolute amount player 3 sends to 
player 2 only when player 2 proposes it and has no effect on the relative amount.  
Interestingly, when a collusion proposal is challenged by a cooperative proposal, the 
negative effect of collusion proposals on the amount player 3 returns to player 1 is offset (1a+2b, 
specification 3) or even reversed (1b+2a, specifications 3 and 6). The positive effect of 
cooperative proposals on the amount exchanged between players 2 and 3 also disappears.  
Finally, promises made by player 3 and appeals made by player 2 do not seem to 
influence the final decisions. 
Therefore, content analysis reveals that the proposals of equal split among three players, 
especially when such proposals were made by both players or used to challenge the collusion 
proposal, significantly increase cooperation between all players, and thus efficiency. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents an experimental study of a novel three-player trust game. In this 
game, player 1 acts as a trustor, player 2 embodies both the trustor’s and trustee’s characteristics, 
and player 3 always acts as a trustee. We also investigate the internal and external effects of 
insider communication on direct and indirect trust and reciprocity. Although the three-player 
trust game requires additional layers of trust than the standard two-player trust game, we still 
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find a substantial level of direct and indirect trust even when there is no communication. 
Consistent with other studies, we find that the level of direct trust and reciprocity is higher than 
the level of indirect trust and reciprocity. 
Regarding insider communication, we find that players 2 and 3 who are engaged in 
communication exhibit more trust and trustworthiness. The most unexpected and positive result 
of our experiment is the effect insider communication has on player 1’s behavior. Although only 
players 2 and 3 are allowed to communicate, we find that player 1’s trust increases by 54%. This 
is because communication activates stronger preference for fairness than collusion between 
players 2 and 3. Expecting that, player 1 exhibits more trust in players 2 and 3. In response, 
player 3 returns higher absolute and relative amounts to player 1. Belief elicitation reveals that 
player 1 persistently overestimates the trustworthiness of player 3, which may also account for 
the high level of trust exhibited by player 1. We also find that the social norms developed during 
the communication stage carry over to the no communication stage. 
Finally, we use content analysis to study what kinds of messages enhance cooperation. In 
the multivariate analysis of communication, we find that the messages that significantly increase 
cooperation are the ones that indicate willingness to split all earnings equally. 
Our study provides evidence that economic agents exhibit direct and indirect trust in 
multi-level interactions among strangers. One mechanism that can further promote trust and 
reciprocity is communication even when only a subgroup of agents can afford to communicate 
with each other. Since communication between insiders may raise the concerns of forming 
collusion at the cost of the outsiders, to better use this mechanism, insiders should deliver the 
idea that communication activates more fairness norms toward the outsiders. This suggests that 
to build trust with individual investors in FOF, managers have to send clear signals to investors 
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that their interests of obtaining cooperative, fair and efficient outcomes from the investment are 
perfectly aligned. 
As a first attempt to use simplified laboratory experiments to explore trusting behaviour 
and effect of communication in multi-level interactions, caution would be suggested in drawing 
direct inferences from our results. Nevertheless, our findings may shed some light on the 
important causal factors affecting the emergence of many web-based auctions and other forms of 
online businesses which are built on trust and reciprocity among strangers (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser, 2002). For example, in the wholesale eBay online auction, as a consumer wholesale 
distributor, you can buy products at an unbeatable wholesale price from suppliers and then set 
your sale price in online auctions. Advertising fair trade between you and the wholesale suppliers 
may help to attract more buyers. 
There are many interesting extensions to our research. Future work can investigate how 
trust and reciprocity are affected by different channels of communication, other interactions 
between players (e.g., player 2 can also directly return to player 1), and factors such as the size of 
the endowment and multipliers in the three-player trust game. 
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Figure Caption 
FIGURE 1: Distribution of Return Ratio in the NC and C Treatments 
FIGURE 2a: Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in C-NC Sessions 
FIGURE 2b: Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in NC-C Sessions 
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1. We chose to study insider communication between players 2 and 3 for several reasons. First, 
full communication among all players is less feasible in reality and easier to break down as the 
size of the communicating group grows. Second, restricting communication between insiders 
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allows us to examine the impact of such asymmetric communication on both the insiders’ and 
outsiders’ behavior. Third, as we discuss in Section III, predictions about the effects of insider 
communication are not trivial, and thus conducting a laboratory experiment is important. 
2. In a repeated three-player centipede game, Rapoport et al. (2003) find that neither full 
cooperation nor full non-cooperation is supported. In a mixed population of human players and 
robots, Murphy et al. (2004) find that there is an increase in the propensity of human players to 
cooperate over time when a handful of cooperative robots are added while adding a handful of 
non-cooperative robots does not change the cooperation rate. 
3. In the terminology of Nowak and Sigmund (2005) there is direct reciprocity and two types of 
indirect reciprocity, i.e., upstream or observation-based (“A helps B because B helped C”) and 
downstream or experience-based (“A helps B because C helped A”). In our experiment, player 3 
may reciprocate to player 1 because player 1 indirectly helped player 3 (direct reciprocity), 
because player 1 helped player 2 (observation-based indirect reciprocity), and because player 2 
helped player 3 (experience-based indirect reciprocity). We report the evidence of the two types 
of indirect reciprocity in Section IV. 
4. Two sessions (one NC-C and one C-NC) had 12 subjects and two other sessions had 24 
subjects.  
5. Greiner and Levati (2005) use a variant of a trust game in order to implement a cyclical 
network of indirect reciprocity where the first individual may help the second, the second help 
the third, and so on until the last, who in turn may help the first. Like in a two-player trust game, 
the authors find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual trust in the multi-player 
environment. Buchner et al. (2004) compare the trust-reciprocity regimes with the explicit 
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incentive schemes in the context of a three-person ultimatum game. They find that mutual trust is 
as good as incentive contracts in inducing costly actions by employees. 
6. Dufwenberg et al. (2001) allow trustees to reciprocate towards the other trustors, and find that 
indirect reciprocity induces only insignificantly smaller donations than direct reciprocity and that 
trustees are more rewarding in the case of indirect reciprocity. Guth et al. (2001) find that 
indirect reward reduces significantly mutual cooperation compared to the direct reward. In the 
same line of research, Seinen and Schram (2006) and Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provide 
experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity in the “repeated helping game” developed by 
Nowak and Sigmund (1998). In this game, donors decide whether or not to provide costly help to 
the recipients they are matched with, based on information about the recipients’ behavior in 
encounters with third parties. 
7. Glaeser et al. (2000) allow face to face communication before playing the trust game. They 
find that when individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness increase. They 
conclude that trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside 
of the experiments. Buchan et al. (2006) allow subjects to engage in personal but not task-
relevant communication before playing the trust game and find significant increase of trust and 
trustworthiness. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) allow either trustor or trustee, but not both, to 
send free-form messages in a binary trust game. They find that the messages sent by trustees 
increase both trust and trustworthiness. However, no such effect is found when only trustors can 
send messages. Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009) allow two-way communication and find that 
verbal communication helps subjects to reach agreement even without visual or auditory contact. 
Similarly, Ben-Ner et al. (2011) allow two-way communication and find that trust and 
trustworthiness increase when verbal communication is allowed. 
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8. For a robustness check, we also estimated panel models with individual subjects representing 
the random effects (to control for individual effects), standard errors clustered at the session level 
(to control for possible correlation within a session), and a period trend (to control for learning 
and experience). The estimation results confirm our main conclusions and are available from the 
authors upon request. All p-values reported in the paper are two-sided unless otherwise stated. 
9. To formally test Hypothesis 2, we estimated the two-level mixed-effects model where the 
dependent variable is the amount sent per period by players 1 and 2 and the independent 
variables are a constant, a period variable and a player-type dummy. Based on the estimation, the 
amount sent by player 1 to player 2 is significantly lower than the amount sent by player 2 to 
player 3 (p-value < 0.01). The significance disappears when we regress on the share of income 
sent which accounts for the amount received by player 2 before sending to player 3. A similar 
model regressing the amount player 3 returns to players 2 and 1 on the same set of independent 
variables reports that player 3 sent back marginally more to player 2 than to player 1 (one-sided 
p-value = 0.10). No significant difference is found based on the relative amount sent by player 3. 
10. The use of non-parametric tests is not feasible in our analyses, as the observations are not 
independent. Instead we reserve to regressions which control of individual effects (since the 
same subject makes multiple choices), session effects (since all subjects interact in the same 
session), and a time trend (since the trust game is repeated).  
11. A two sided proportion test indicates that the number of cases where player 3 splits equally 
between all three players is significant higher than the number of cases where player 3 splits only 
between players 2 and 3 in C treatment (p-value < 0.01). 
12. Based on the estimation of mixed-effect models where the dependent variables are the period 
profits for each player and the independent variables are a treatment dummy and a period trend, 
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we find that profits are significantly higher in the communication treatment for all player types 
(p-value < 0.01 for players 1 and 2, p-value = 0.01 for player 3). A similar model regressing total 
earnings of three players per period on a treatment dummy and a period trend reports 
significantly positive communication effect (p-value < 0.01). 
13. Each subject can see the decisions of all three participants in the group made at each stage 
from the outcome screen and we asked subjects to write down all the decisions for each period in 
the personal record sheet. 
14. The increase of cooperation when communication is introduced in NC-C sessions and the 
decay of cooperation when communication is removed in C-NC sessions are similar to the 
findings with respect to the effect of costly punishment in repeated public goods game with 
stranger protocol (Fehr and Gachter, 2000b). More interestingly, we find the communication is 
less effective in C-NC sessions than in NC-C sessions. Such order effect is not observed with the 
punishment mechanism. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this analogy.  
15. We chose to elicit the beliefs of only player 1 for several reasons. First, the most interesting 
questions of the current paper are about player 1’s behavior, so eliciting player 1’s belief was a 
natural choice. Second, player 1 had the most “free” time in the experiment. After making the 
decision, player 1 would have to wait for about 5 minutes before players 2 and 3 communicated 
and made their decisions. The fact that players 2 and 3 were more occupied in our experiment 
also motivated us not to elicit players 2’s and 3’s beliefs. Finally, we felt that subjects assigned 
as player 1 had the least interesting roles, in a sense that they had to make the same 
unconditional decisions over and over again. So, we decided to provide player 1 with an 
additional “productive” task. 
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16. It is also important to emphasize that eliciting beliefs may cause risk-averse subjects to hedge 
between choices made in the experiment and incentivized belief statements. However, Blanco et 
al. (2010) find no evidence of such hedging. 
17. Based on the estimation of random effect models, where the dependent variable is the 
amount predicted minus the actual amount sent, we find that the difference between predicted 
and actual behavior of player 2 is not significantly different from zero neither in the NC 
treatment (p-value = 0.14) nor in the C treatment (p-value = 0.92). Similarly, the difference 
between predicted and actual behavior of player 3 towards player 2 is not significantly different 
from zero neither in the NC treatment (p-value = 0.34) nor in the C treatment (p-value = 0.83). 
18. Based on the estimation of random effect models, where the dependent variable is the 
amount predicted minus the actual amount sent, we find that the difference between predicted 
and actual behavior of player 3 towards player 1 is significantly different from zero both in the 
NC treatment (p-value < 0.01) and in the C treatment (p-value = 0.02). 
19. The instructions for coders are available in the online Appendix II. 
20. For binary 0 or 1 coding, agreement by chance is 50%. 
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Table 1: Summary of Average Amount Sent and Profit  
 
Decision 
Amount Sent Share of Income Sent 
Player 
Profit 
Share of 
Total Profit 
NC C NC C NC C NC C 
P1 to P2 39 (39) 60 (40) 0.39 (0.39) 0.60 (0.40) P1 96 176 0.20 0.20 
P2 to P3 96 (107) 231 (143) 0.43 (0.40) 0.82 (0.32) P2 178 297 0.33 0.35 
P3 to P1 35 (61) 136 (172) 0.07 (0.11) 0.14 (0.15) P3 296 410 0.47 0.45 
P3 to P2 57 (111) 247 (189) 0.10 (0.15) 0.30 (0.18) Efficiency, % 43.8  67.9      
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Treatment Effects  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 
Amount Sent   Amount Sent Relative to Income 
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2   P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2 
C-treatment 18.29* 131.57*** 100.11*** 189.22*** 
 
0.18* 0.39*** 0.07** 0.20*** 
  [1 if C treatment] (10.32) (30.95) (27.38) (36.28) 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) 
Period 0.11 5.71* -0.72 5.04 
 
0.00 0.02** -0.01** 0.00 
  [period trend] (1.08) (3.33) (2.88) (3.91) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 41.18*** 66.50** 39.55 29.66 
 
0.41*** 0.33*** 0.10*** 0.08** 
 
(9.58) (28.53) (25.02) (33.46) 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 
 
240 240 240 240 
Note: All regressions are estimated using mixed-effects. The models have random effects at both the individual level and the 
session level and account for second-order autocorrelation in the within-individual residuals. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance levels are: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Player 3’s Reciprocal Behavior 
 
Classification of Player 3’s behavior NC treatment C treatment Z-stat 
P3 sent nothing to P1 and split (almost) equally between P2 and P3 0.0% 11.3% 
 P3 split (almost) equally between P1, P2 and P3 0.0% 27.8% 
 P3 kept everything 23.5% 12.4% -1.88* 
P3 was trustworthy both to P1 and P2 16.2% 26.8% 1.61* 
P3 was trustworthy to P1 but not to P2 45.6% 7.2% -5.76*** 
P3 was trustworthy to P2 but not to P1 2.9% 9.3% 1.61* 
P3 was trustworthy neither to P1 nor to P2 11.8% 5.2% -1.55 
Observations 68 97 4.04*** 
Note: We only included cases where both players 1 and 2 sent a positive amount. The amount differs less than 
10% is counted as almost equal. The Z-stat reflects the two sample test of proportions. Significance levels are: * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness 
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P2 P3 to P1 
P1 to P2 
 
1.77*** -0.75*** 0.41*** 
    [P1 to P2 in the current period] 
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.13) 
P2 to P3 
  
0.89*** 0.51*** 
    [P2 to P3 in the current period] 
  
(0.04) (0.04) 
P1 to P2 lag -0.09 -0.75*** -0.24 0.09 
    [P1 to P2 average over all past periods] (0.11) (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) 
P2 to P3 lag 0.00 0.23** -0.09 -0.08 
    [P2 to P3 average over all past periods] (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
P3 to P1 lag 0.06*** -0.02 -0.04 0.18*** 
    [P3 to P1 average over all past periods] (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
P3 to P2 lag 0.00 0.14** 0.24*** 0.06 
    [P3 to P2 average over all past periods] (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
C-treatment 30.69*** 52.92*** 77.93*** -9.97 
    [1 if C treatment] (5.14) (15.39) (15.99) (14.73) 
Period -1.97*** -2.23 -4.29** -5.79*** 
    [period trend] (0.57) (1.60) (1.81) (1.67) 
Constant 50.71*** 49.08*** 32.42* -4.62 
  (6.01) (16.40) (18.63) (17.16) 
Observations 648 648 648 648 
R-squared 0.30 0.59 0.68 0.53 
Note: All regressions are estimated using a system of simultaneous equations (SE). In each 
regression we also control for period, subject, and session effects. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels are: * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.  
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Table 5: Treatment and Order Effects 
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 
Amount Sent   Amount Sent Relative to Income 
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2   P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2 
C-treatment x NC-C 38.71*** 171.62*** 130.86*** 175.25*** 
 
0.39*** 0.25** 0.01 0.12*** 
    [1 if C treatment and NC-C session] (9.73) (32.20) (32.37) (37.57) 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
C-treatment x C-NC -2.57 37.16 -54.31 62.15 
 
-0.03 0.13 -0.10*** 0.10*** 
    [1 if C treatment and C-NC session] (8.35) (29.11) (33.82) (37.85) 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) 
NC-treatment x NC-C -13.74 -56.45 -99.17** -125.72*** -0.14 -0.19* -0.17*** -0.10** 
    [1 if NC treatment and NC-C session] (11.12) (37.53) (41.38) (46.74)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
NC-treatment x C-NC 68.00*** 207.39*** 222.81*** 215.88*** 
 
0.68*** 0.67*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 
    [1 if NC treatment and C-NC session] (11.60) (39.79) (46.40) (51.66) 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
Period -1.68*** -5.10** -9.49*** -6.08** 
 
-0.02*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 
    [period trend] (0.64) (2.21) (2.61) (2.90) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 480 480 480 480 
 
480 480 480 480 
Wald test for order effect on C-treatment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016   0.000 0.278 0.016 0.711 
Wald test for order effect on NC-treatment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Note: All regressions are estimated using a random effects error structure with the individual subject effects. In each regression we also include 
dummy variables (not shown in the table) to control for session effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are: * significant at 
10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of Average Expected Amount Sent and Percentage Difference 
 
Decision 
Expected Amount 
Sent  
Actual Amount 
Sent  
Percentage Difference 
From Actual Decisions 
NC C 
 
NC C 
 
NC C 
P2 to P3 80 233   96 231   16.8% 0.9% 
P3 to P2 71 251 
 
57 247 
 
24.6% 1.6% 
P3 to P1 60 191   35 136   71.4% 40.4% 
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Table 7: Coding Table, Reliability Indexes, and Frequency of Coding 
 
Code Description 
Cohen’s 
Kappa K 
Frequency 
of coding 
 Messages sent by player 2   
1a P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.53 21.7% 
1b P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 0.75 20.4% 
1c P2 proposed to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.81 0.4% 
1d P2 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1 0.76 3.8% 
1e P2 made a negative comment about P1 0.50 7.1% 
1f P2 made any promises or showed trust in P3 0.39 4.6% 
1g P2 used threat 0.39 1.3% 
1h P2 pleaded or appealed to P3  0.53 10.8% 
 
Messages sent by player 3 
  2a P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.74 32.5% 
2b P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 0.77 24.6% 
2c P3 proposed to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  0.77 1.7% 
2d P3 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1 0.50 5.8% 
2e P3 made a negative comment about P1 0.49 6.3% 
2f P3 made any promises or showed trustworthiness 0.72 9.6% 
2g P3 mentioned about his or her good qualities 0.32 0.8% 
 
Messages indicating agreement or disagreement between players 2 and 3  
  3a Agreement was reached on the first proposal 0.70 69.2% 
3b Agreement was reached on a different proposal than the first proposal 0.67 22.9% 
3c Agreement was not reached N/A 0.0% 
Note: The amount differs less than 10% is counted as almost equal. 
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Table 8: Multilevel Mixed-effects Regression on Categories of Messages 
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Amount Sent Amount sent Relative to Income 
P2 to P3 P3 to P2 P3 to P1 P2 to P3 P3 to P2 P3 to P1 
 Only one player made a proposal       
1a P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  -2.37 42.48 -124.17*** 0.07 0.11** -0.13*** 
  
(37.13) (55.22) (39.64) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
1b P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 109.46** 141.29** 150.30*** 0.14 0.05 0.10** 
  
(44.19) (65.76) (48.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) 
2a P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3  -16.89 -42.50 -142.32*** 0.12* 0.05 -0.15*** 
  
(29.01) (43.57) (31.67) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
2b P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 133.98*** 65.21 139.74*** 0.16** -0.06 0.10*** 
  
(29.87) (45.17) (33.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
 The same proposal made by players 2 and 3       
1a+2a Both P2 and P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split 
between P2 and P3 
66.34* -0.78 -126.98*** 0.27*** 0.06 -0.15*** 
 
(35.07) (56.56) (39.87) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
1b+2b Both P2 and P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 173.87*** 149.93* 246.40*** 0.23* 0.00 0.11** 
  
(57.67) (81.90) (59.79) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05) 
Two different proposals made by players 2 and 3       
1a+2b P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3 
while P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 
61.12 35.90 31.41 0.09 -0.05 0.11** 
 
(51.56) (79.20) (58.36) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) 
1b+2a P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3 
while P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3 
85.11 117.72 211.53*** -0.06 -0.03 0.13** 
 (67.07) (97.58) (72.88) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) 
 The most frequently used messages       
1h P2 pleaded or appealed to P3  67.17 56.99 4.68 0.21* 0.04 0.01 
  
(50.44) (76.70) (55.92) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) 
2f P3 made any promises or showed trustworthiness 25.51 71.86 33.61 0.07 0.00 0.00 
  
(35.21) (51.97) (36.53) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
Period 6.98 8.47 2.63 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 
    [period trend] (4.49) (7.53) (4.51) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Constant 129.78*** 153.63*** 134.59*** 0.59*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 
   (36.25) (54.68) (32.57) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) 
  Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are: * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  
Figure 1: Distribution of Return Ratio in the NC and C Treatments 
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Figure 2a: Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in C-NC Sessions 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in NC-C Sessions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount sent
PeriodP1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount sent
PeriodP1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
 40 
 
Appendix I (For Online Publication) – The Instructions for the NC-C Session 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision making. 
Various research agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If 
you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of 
money. The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars 
at a rate of _100_ francs to one dollar. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in 
private and in cash.   24   participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
The experiment is composed of 2 parts. Each part consists of 10 decision making periods. 
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The 24 
participants will be randomly assigned into 8 three-person groups. In addition to the group 
assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group, 
designated as Person 1, Person 2, and Person 3. You will remain in the same type throughout 
the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two other 
participants to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group. 
The following diagram shows how this part of the experiment proceeds: 
 
 
 
 
During each period, you and the other two participants in your group will make choices 
which will determine your payoffs. Each period is comprised of three stages. At Stage 1 Person 1 
can send to Person 2 any amount X between 0 and 100 francs. Amount X sent by Person 1 is 
multiplied by 3. At Stage 2 Person 2 can send to Person 3 any amount Y between 0 and 100 + 
Person 1 can send to Person 
2 any amount X between 0 
and 100 francs 
Person 2 can send to Person 3 
any amount Y between 0 and 
100 + 3X francs 
Person 3 can send back to Person 1 
and/or Person 2 any amount 
between 0 and 100 + 3Y francs 
Stage 3 
Stage 2 
amount Y sent 
by Person 2 is 
multiplied by 3 
amount X sent 
by Person 1 is 
multiplied by 3 
Stage 1 
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3X francs. Amount Y sent by Person 2 is multiplied by 3. At Stage 3 Person 3 can send back to 
Person 1 and/or Person 2 any amount between 0 and 100 + 3Y francs. 
More specifically, Person 1, 2 and 3 are given the initial of 100 francs in their individual 
accounts. At Stage 1 Person 1 makes a decision how many francs to send to Person 2 and how 
many francs to allocate to his or her individual account, as shown on the screen below.  
 
 
Decision Screen for Person 1 at Stage 1 
 
Person 1 has the opportunity to send any number of francs between 0 and 100 to Person 
2’s account. Each franc sent by Person 1 is multiplied by 3. For example, if Person 1 sends 40 
francs to Person 2, the amount received by Person 2 is 120 francs (40×3=120). At the end of 
Stage 1 Person 2 and 3 learn the decision made by Person 1 and the total amount of francs in all 
three individual accounts. 
At Stage 2 Person 2 will then decide how many francs to send to Person 3 and how 
many francs to allocate to his or her individual account. Person 2 can send any amount of francs 
available in his/her account at that time. Each franc sent by Person 2 is multiplied by 3. For 
example, if Person 2 sends 60 francs, the amount received by Person 3 is 180 francs (60×3=180). 
At the end of Stage 2 Person 3 and 1 learn the decisions made by Person 2 and the total amount 
of francs in all three individual accounts. 
  
Allocation to the 
individual account 
Allocation to 
 Person 2 
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The decision screen for Person 2 is as following: 
 
 Decision Screen for Person 2 at Stage 2 
 
At Stage 3 Person 3 will then decide how many francs to send back to Person 1, how 
many francs to send back to Person 2, and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual 
account as shown in the following screen: 
 
Decision Screen for Person 3 
Allocation to the 
individual account 
Allocation to 
 Person 3 
Allocation to the 
individual account 
Allocation to 
 Person 2 
Allocation to 
 Person 1 
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Finally, at the end of the Stage 3 the total period earnings and the decisions of all three 
participants in the group made at each stage are reported to each person as shown in the outcome 
screen below:  
 
 
Outcome Screen 
 
Once the outcome screen is displayed, please record your results for the period on your 
record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. 
All three Persons in the group have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the francs 
available to them. You will remain in the same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning 
of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two other participants to from a three-
person group, with one person of each type in each group. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 10 periods for actual 
payment in Part 1 using dice roll (ten-sided die with numbers from 1 to 10). You will sum the 
total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last 
page of your record sheet. 
Are there any questions? 
 
PREDICTIONS BY PERSON 1 (This part of the instructions was given only to 
person 1) 
 
You are assigned to be Person 1. After you make your decision in Stage 1, you will be 
asked to enter three predictions in Stage 2: prediction about how many francs will Person 2 send 
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to Person 3, prediction about how many francs will Person 3 send back to Person 2, and 
prediction about how many francs will Person 3 send back to you. In addition to your earnings 
from the individual account you will be paid for the number of correct predictions you make. 
In particular, at the end of the period, we will look at the choices actually made by Person 2 and 
3 you are paired with and compare their choices to your predictions. You will be paid 10 francs 
for each prediction if your prediction differs by no more than 5 percent from the actual decision 
made. If your prediction differs by more than 5 percent from the actual decision made, you will 
receive 0 francs for that prediction. 
The decision screen for prediction is as following: 
 
 
Note that since your prediction is made before you know what actual decisions are made 
by Person 2 and Person 3 you are paired with, you maximize the expected size of your prediction 
payoff by simply stating your true beliefs about what you think Person 2 and Person 3 will do. 
Any other prediction will decrease the amount you can expect to earn from your prediction 
payoff. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The rules for 
Part 2 are exactly the same as the rules for Part 1.  
The only difference is that in this part of the experiment, after Stage 1, Person 2 and 
Person 3 will have an opportunity to communicate with each other in a chat window. The 
communication will take place only after Person 2 and 3 have learned the decision made by 
Person 1. Person 2 and 3 will have 90 seconds to chat with each other anonymously. Although 
we will record the messages, only Person 2 and 3 will see them. Note, in sending messages back 
and forth we request that you follow two simple rules: (1) Be civil to each other and use no 
profanity and (2) Do not identify yourself.  
How many francs do you predict 
Person 2 will send to Person 3? 
How many francs do you predict 
Person 3 will send back to you? 
How many francs do you predict 
Person 3 will send back to Person 2? 
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After the chat period is over, at Stage 2 Person 2 will decide how many francs to send to 
Person 3 and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account. At the end of Stage 2 
Person 3 and 1 learn the decisions made by Person 2 and the total amount of francs in all three 
individual accounts. 
At Stage 3 Person 3 will then decide how many francs to send back to Person 1, how 
many francs to send back to Person 2, and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual 
account.  
Finally, at the end of the Stage 3 the earnings for all three participants in the group are 
reported to each person. Please record your results for the period on your record sheet under the 
appropriate heading. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. 
All three Persons in the group have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the francs 
available to them. You will remain in the same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning 
of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two other participants to from a three-
person group, with one person of each type in each group.  
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 10 periods for actual 
payment in Part 2 using dice roll (ten-sided die with numbers from 1 to 10). You will sum the 
total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last 
page of your record sheet. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
Appendix II (For Online Publication) – Instructions for Coders 
Coding Instructions 
 
Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game. 
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment. 
 
Coding Rules:  
 
(1) The unit of observation is all messages in a given period. You should not start to code 
until you finish reading all messages in a given period. It is very important to look at the 
context of the messages across lines to properly interpret and code them.  
(2) If a unit of observation is deemed to contain the relevant category of content, enter the 
code for the category in the relevant column beside the first line of the unit.  
(3) Each unit can be coded under as many or few categories as you deem appropriate. Enter 
the additional codes in columns to the right. 
(4) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which 
statements should fall into which categories. 
(5) Your job is to capture what had been said rather than why it was said or what effect it 
had. Think of yourself as a “coding machine.” 
(6) Code the sessions in the chronological order that the sessions were conducted, as 
explained and presented by your coding supervisor. 
 
Please track the time you spend on coding the messages and training. You will be paid $12 for 
each hour working on this project.  
 
Thanks a lot for your participation in the coding task! 
